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September 6th, 2019 12:14:15 pm

(Re)Imagining (Re)Habilitation: An Argument from Death Row

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Abstract

- Full author list: Elizabeth Lanphier, Takunda Matose, and Abu Ali Abdur Rahman - In this paper we argue that programs focused on rehabilitation in the setting of mass incarceration is an incoherent goal given that rehabilitation presupposes prior habilitation. Yet histories of social and personal trauma render this initial habilitation illusive, at best, for much of the population that ends up incarcerated in a setting such as Death Row. Our claim is that traumatic histories can impede development and lead to antisocial consequences to such an extent that our pursuit of justice within and without carceral systems needs to be habilitative rather than rehabilitative. The unique vision of habilitation which emerges from Death Row, and the context in which mass incarceration arises in the US in particular, challenges and strengthens the concept of habilitation. Moreover, an habilitative approach questions the very logic of rehabilitative projects in settings of mass incarceration. We argue that a reinforced vision of habilitation upends the stated objective of “rehabilitation” in mass incarceration settings, and gives reason to replace “rehabilitative” projects with “habilitative” projects. We further argue that in doing so, the very logic of mass incarceration is also turned on its head. In conclusion, we suggest how a habilitative response to individual and social trauma would yield a different kind of justice system, that is neither retributive nor restorative, but in fact deeply habilitative – and transformative.

Introduction

Tennessee’s Death Row (TDR), like most prisons and jails in the United States (US), implements programming whose values, justification, and objectives revolve around the rehabilitation of those who have been convicted. In the case of TDR, programming ranges from art and writing classes, to conflict resolution training and certification, and divinity and philosophy courses that address topics including: justice, trauma, friendship, compassion, healing, and storytelling. These programs are valuable. Yet our contention is that “rehabilitation” is an incoherent goal given the conditions under which it tends to be pursued on TDR and its peer institutions in the US.(1) Our approach recasts rehabilitation, and in the spirit of prison abolition, reimagines the role of incarceration.  

We will argue that rehabilitation presupposes prior habilitation. Yet histories of social and personal trauma render this initial habilitation illusive, at best, for much of the population that ends up incarcerated in a setting such as Death Row. In referencing social and personal traumas, we mean to encompass the entire range of physical, psychological, and emotional harms that adversely affect the ability of social groups and individuals to thrive as members of society. Our claim is that these traumatic histories can impede development and lead to antisocial consequences to such an extent that our pursuit of justice within and without carceral systems needs to be habilitative rather than rehabilitative. Once we account for the importance of habilitation, we argue that we need to deeply reassess the objectives of mass incarceration in a context like the US.

Our argument unfolds according to three main moves. First, we explicate the theoretical concept of “habilitation.” Second, we describe the unique conceptualization of habilitation that emerges out of the lived experience of trauma prior to and during incarceration on Death Row. An habilitative approach questions the very logic of rehabilitative projects in settings of mass incarceration. We further argue that the vision of habilitation which emerges from Death Row, and the context in which mass incarceration arises in the US in particular, challenges and strengthens the concept of habilitation. Third, we argue that this reinforced vision of habilitation upends the stated objective of “rehabilitation” in mass incarceration settings, and gives reason to replace “rehabilitative” projects with “habilitative” projects. We further argue that in doing so, the very logic of mass incarceration is also turned on its head.

In conclusion, we suggest how a habilitative response to individual and social trauma would yield a different kind of justice system, that is neither retributive nor restorative, but in fact deeply habilitative – and transformative. Moreover, the burden of transformation does not fall entirely on the incarcerated persons; this transformation and habilitation is the work of the entire socio-political community.

Habilitation as a Concept

Lawrence C. Becker has offered a concept of habilitation as a framework for basic justice.(2) He defines habilitation as “the effort to equip a person or thing with a range of functional abilities or capacities.”(3) According to Becker, habilitation promotes the individual agency that is necessary to continually self-habilitate across a lifespan.

For Becker, habilitation is an adaptive process that requires some basic scaffolding and predictability of one’s environment and resources to allow for the development of an individual’s capacity for self-agency. Moreover, habilitation as basic justice is about establishing practices as an entire society, not merely in individual cases. If habilitation tracks onto a framework for basic justice, then we are talking about something that everyone who participates in the society must take part in, and are each owed. Becker notes that “the circumstances of habilitation for basic justice are those under which hospitable social environments can arise and be sustained.”(4) 

Initially favorable habilitative environments are intended to produce the individual capacity for ongoing self-habilitation, of which Becker takes individual “complex rational agency” to be a “relentless source.”(5) While we resist the suggestion that the development of complex rational agency is necessarily hampered in the absence of  favorable conditions, we agree with Becker that the initial conditions of and for habilitation determine the trajectory of individual and group habilitative capacities. Consequently, we ought not underestimate the value of hospitable environments, which act as a sort of initial investment into a growing habilitative portfolio.

Becker acknowledges that habilitation is subject to one’s greater social, economic, and political context, as well as personal circumstances. The ability to habilitate in many ways speaks more to your context than your natural abilities. Yet we worry that Becker’s account casts certain failures of habilitation primarily as individual failures, based on individual choices, and shortcomings. While he uses a human developmental approach which acknowledges that infants require support and nurturing, the absence of which results in a failure to thrive,(6) he also concludes that a serious level of deprivation would have to occur to block an individual with “necessary physical endowments” from not developing her own “complex rational agency.”(7) He claims that only “minimally good physical and psychological health,” through “any minimally favorable physical and social environment” can produce this outcome.(8) The implication of these claims is that on Becker’s account, negative social actions such as criminality are almost always the result of the deliberate and reckless choice of individuals.(9) 

While we agree with Becker’s assessment that complex rational agency is not made unattainable by unfavorable developmental conditions, we take it to be a blind spot in Becker’s account that he does not entertain the possibility that purported criminality can be a symptom of inadequate habilitation. Becker does not allow that criminality, along with other adverse social realities, can be the result of societal failures in contexts such as the US. Not accounting for this possibility also leads to a mischaracterization of incarcerated persons as deliberately criminal in all instances. Instead, we suggest that certain criminal acts should be understood as the complex product of a series of historical, personal, and social traumas. Moreover, this understanding ought to challenge us to think differently about responsibility, including social and political responsibility, in addition to individual responsibility.

Habilitation in the Setting of Mass Incarceration

To be clear, we are not suggesting those who have done harms, whether convicted of them or not in a criminal justice system, should not take responsibility for them. But we think that responsibility should be understood as more broadly answerable and distributed than an individual model of responsibility allows. We offer instead an account that foregrounds the premise that habilitation is a process situated within, and produced in part by, societies. This foregrounding allows us to make two claims.

First, habilitative failures can occur societally at such a scale and locus that individuals cannot reasonably be held responsible for them. An example of such failures is the sort of systemic social sabotage in low-income communities in the US driven by anti-Black animus that Orlando Patterson calls social death, and on which theorists ranging from W.E.B. Du Bois to contemporary prison abolitionists like Angela Davis have commented. Second, because such habilitative failures cannot reasonably be understood as individual, the responsibility for addressing and correcting for them lies with societies and communities.(10) 

If habilitative failures can be societal in the way just suggested, but are not evenly distributed throughout a society as in the case of anti-Black animus, it can no longer be reasonably assumed that all members of that society can achieve the same habilitative threshold. Further, it cannot be assumed that individuals can independently correct for these societally-caused habilitative failures. Yet, as suggested earlier, many carceral systems are premised on the idea that the incarcerated have regressed from some prior adequate level of habilitation, and that as individuals they are responsible for and capable of returning themselves to the threshold level of habilitation. These assumptions drive the operationalization of prisons as rehabilitative sites. But, if our counterclaims about the societal nature of certain habilitative failures are accurate, then the project of prisons as rehabilitative is undermined in contexts such as the contemporary US. Instead, habilitative projects might be needed.

Scholarship on prisons and within the prison abolitionist movement has been consistent with this stance largely because it condemns the current state of mass incarceration as a continuation of systemic societal failures that can be linked to anti-Black animus and the history of chattel slavery in the Americas.(11) And while we are inclined to think that these societal failures may be so pervasive and severe as to require a complete dismantling of the entire prison-industrial complex in the US, our theoretical framework does not entail that prisons are always incoherent.

Instead, our account suggests that a radical overhaul of carceral systems can occur incrementally through two habilitative approaches. One, the focus of carceral systems needs to shift from incoherent attempts to “re-habilitate” in contexts where habilitation never happened, to habilitative ones. Two, the burdens of habilitative projects need to transfer from being the sole domain of individual incarcerated persons to being shared among various communities. This includes communities internal to incarcerated populations, but ought not be reliant only on such “insider” communities.

Our approach to conceptualizing habilitation helps us head off what might be an obvious objection to our account. As Becker notes, most individuals of relative cognitive health are capable of sufficient complex rational agency and can be held responsible for their individual acts. Additionally, in certain cultural and political contexts such as contemporary Norway, where the society is more homogeneous and residents are (in general) supported by substantive social programs to which they have (relatively) equitable access, we might be able to assume that citizens start from a point of general habilitation, in Becker’s terms. Such social infrastructure for habilitation might help explain why Norway has the lowest recidivism rates in the world.(12) In these contexts, one might argue that the concept of rehabilitation is coherent and appropriate if members of a society have already achieved and can return to some threshold level of habilitation.

We grant this point, but our view is that this kind of society-wide infrastructure is seldom achieved, and societal failures that lead to the deep histories of personal and structural trauma endured prior to incarceration more commonly result in failures of habilitation.(13) Such failures of habilitation often render the goal of prisoner “rehabilitation” a contradictory objective in the sense that one cannot “return” to a level not previously achieved, one cannot be held individually responsible for correcting a societal failure, and, as is the case with high recidivism and practices such as life without parole and the death penalty, the system precludes the possibility of individuals returning to a societally relevant state of habilitation given that the end-game is itself social exclusion.(14) In other words, rehabilitation sees offenses leading to mass incarceration as the personal failures of well-equipped individuals with comparable conditions of childhood and moral development who are able to return to those conditions.

Yet, as we have argued, persons are often not afforded the same conditions for childhood and moral development. Systemically oppressive structures in places like the US, including a growing wealth gap, and continued pathological anti-Black animus born out of our history with chattel slavery, along with ongoing marginalization of racial, ethnic, sexual, or religious minorities persist. We are far from the ideal of reasonably equitable access to hospitable environments for habilitation that would yield adequately habilitated individuals who could continue to habilitate themselves, let alone who have reached a stage of initial habilitation to which they can be rehabilitated.

Instead, social and personal histories of trauma deprive some groups and individuals from necessary habilitative resources, while at the same time rigidly reinforcing ongoing social exclusion that systemically blocks the possibility of change, while ensuring renewed traumatic exposure. These histories of trauma, we suggest, are behind much behavior that is identified as criminal or deviant. Histories of trauma normalize cycles of abuse and necessitate harmful responses to stressors that would be absent in ideal societal contexts.

Studies within incarcerated populations have shown a correlation between childhood trauma and aggression,(15) and indicated a demonstrable link between childhood trauma and becoming incarcerated in the first place, not merely on aggressive behavior once incarcerated.(16) While the nature of childhood traumas and the crimes for which individuals were incarcerated varied among subjects, one study indicated a correlation “between childhood traumatization and criminal behavior in terms of subsequent offending but not in terms of severity of offense.”(17) 

Childhood trauma is associated with “increased risk of violent and aggressive behavior and criminality in adulthood,” and childhood trauma is a predictor for “dissociation,” which disrupts “normally integrated functions of memory, perception identity, consciousness and motor control.”(18) Moreover, “adverse family experiences during childhood,” which include “family dysfunction, parental separation/divorce, incarceration of a household member, low-income, mental illness, substance abuse and domestic violence are all considered childhood stressors that lead to negative mental, physical, and behavioral health outcomes.”(19) 

We take it that childhood trauma and adverse family experiences are failures of habilitation. Moreover, we identify such histories of trauma as societal failures constituted by historical oppression, structural injustice, and social marginalization that prevents all members of a society from being afforded the same trajectory of personal and moral development. Furthermore, the data indicating a preponderance of habilitative failure among incarcerated persons reinforce the anecdotal evidence within our own reciprocal education community on death row. (Reciprocal education is the practice of all participants being equally educators and learners within the group.)

Harold Nichols, who recounts his own history of institutionalization as a child in an orphanage where he faced abuse after the death of his mother and neglect of his violent father,(20) observes that we need to “replace the present penal system with a system of early treatment that provided individuals with the tools necessary to be productive members of society.”(21) We take Nichols to be underscoring habilitative failures on the part of the social structures, and authorities, that were supposed to ensure his well-being, while also recommending a habilitative response to these shortcomings through penal reform. Even when traumatic history is recognized by the carceral system, there is often a failure to address it. As another example, Abu Ali Abdur Rahman has noted that “in two cases” of his, two years apart, “federal judges issued orders for treatment” for “personality disturbance and P.T.S.D.” yet “these orders were ignored.”(22) 

While we are not suggesting that all incarcerated persons have histories of childhood trauma or adverse family experiences, members of our group and their fellow TDR residents often report histories of unattended mental illness in themselves, or among their family members who were supposed to be caring for them as children, experiences of domestic violence and abuse, substance use disorder, racialized violence, and poverty. And when incarceration is a result of these histories, it does not, as currently formulated, offer a sufficient solution to them.

First-person accounts of incarcerated persons affirm not only that the incarcerated have social and personal histories of trauma, but that incarceration itself, along with corollary recidivism, further contributes to these histories of trauma by perpetuating and creating social injustices. Incarceration itself is routinely traumatic.(23) Another TDR author writes in a poem addressed to a fellow incarcerated friend: “Of guards standing, watching once again/Rather than forcefully ordering your door opened/To provide you needed assistance;/Five days without sleep/You are starting to hallucinate/Terrified of going to your cell/Where sleep has hurt – dehumanized.”(24) In this scene, unaddressed physical and mental illness prior to incarceration remains unchecked and blatantly disregarded by the “Many guards and nurses” who “watch you thrash on the floor.”(25) The basic conditions of incarceration exacerbate prior traumas, and retraumatize. If we appreciate the concept of habilitation, we have to address these cases differently than the current carceral system.

Research indicates that educating prisoners has benefits, including reducing recidivism, supporting a positive prison environment, enabling formerly incarcerated individuals to reintegrate into society, and potentially to reduce overall costs to the state.(26) Our position is to underscore how programming can and should meet aims to support the “social skills, artistic development and techniques and strategies to help [incarcerated persons] deal with their emotions” as has been suggested by others.(27) These objectives aptly describe the content of programs on TDR noted earlier. To underscore, our critique is not of programs, but rather how programming is understood, justified, and mobilized.

While we agree that social and emotional strategies are important skills, we emphasize that these are if fact habilitative programs often providing initial skills in these domains, instead of rehabilitating skills that had previously and sufficiently existed. Our incarceration-informed account of “habilitation” underscores that in light of such traumatic histories, there is little to nothing that can be “rehabilitated.” Addressing trauma, then, is necessary to understand, respond to, and interrupt, putative criminal offenses in our society while correcting for habilitative failures.

Conclusion: Habilitative Justice and Reimagining the Role of Prison in the US

Our own experiences of reciprocal education in the setting of Death Row offer a practical model that responds to trauma through our updated framework of habilitation. We understand programs such as our own as doing the work of habilitation, not rehabilitation. It builds a hospitable community in which participants are habilitated in a way that corrects for the habilitative failures produced by inhospitable societal conditions. We engage in programming to both modify perceived ill behavior and equip individuals with habilitative resources they have otherwise been deprived.

Such resources develop habilitative self-agency for individuals through the support and engagement of a community insiders and outsiders. This engagement is aimed at fostering the transformation of individuals, while shifting the burden of that transformation to a community. Such a shift makes it clear that these transformations are appropriately, as Becker would say, in the realm of those things which we can do better together rather than alone.

While our habilitative model does not require the removal of all prisons, it greatly reimagines them. This approach attends to the current circumstances in which over two million people in the US live in the setting of mass incarceration, and identifies these circumstances as societal failures that are issues of justice. On our account of habilitation, the current state of mass incarceration is itself a perpetuation of societal failures since it fails to end the underlying oppression that leads to the targeted criminality. This is a profound failure because, as Elizabeth Anderson has argued, ending oppression is the proper aim of egalitarian justice.(28)

With this aim in mind, we advocate for a re-imagining of the premise and purpose of prisons. For one, prisons in contexts such as the contemporary US should be habilitative projects. As such, the burden of fostering habilitation, and addressing failures to adequately habilitate individuals, shifts from individuals who need to prove their “rehabilitation,” to the community who must nurture habilitation. We contend that habilitative steps can be taken internal to existing systems of mass incarceration as a first, and fruitful step to appropriately respond to personal and social traumas that lead to lives lived in prisons, including on Death Row.

Yet we also conclude that if the objectives and practices of habilitation were fully realized, they would produce carceral institutions virtually unrecognizable from what they are currently, and would eventually render them obsolete. Once we see prison programs as habilitative, then we should also recognize the incoherence of a life sentence, life without parole, or a death sentence. Habilitative programming ought to equip individuals to live, not to deprive them of life.  

Bibliography

Abdur Rahman, Abu Ali. 2013. "Born Not of Love." In So I Can Live: Visions of Life from Death Row, by W.W. Lyon. Nashville: REACH Coalition.

Altintas, Merih, and Mustafa Bilici. 2018. "Evaluation of Childhood Trauma with Respect to Criminal Behavior, Dissociative Experiences, Adverse Family Experiences and psychiatric Backgrounds Among Prison Inmates." Comprehensive Psychiatry 100-107.

Anderson, Elizabeth. 1999. "What is the Point of Equality." Ethics 287-337.

Arditti, Joyce A. 2005. "Families and Incarceration: An Ecological Approach." Families in Society 251-260.

Becker, Lawrence C. 2012. Habilitation, Health, and Agency. New York: Oxford University Press.

Beckett, Katherine, and Bruce Western. 2001. "Governing Social Marginality." Punishment and Society 43-59.

Clear, Todd R., Dina R. Rose, and Judith A. Ryder. 2001. "Incarceration and the Community: The Problem of Removing and Returning Offenders." Crime and Delinquency 335-351.

Davis, Angela, interview by Avery F. Gordon. 1998. Globalism and the prison industrial complex (September 24-27).

DeVeaux, Mika'il. 2013. "The Trauma of the Incarceration Experience." Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 257-278.

Du Bois, W.E.B. 1986. "The Conservation of Races." In Writings, by W.E.B. Du Bois, 815-826. New York: The Library of America.

—. 1986. The Souls of Black Folk. New York, NY: Literary Classics of the United States.

Esperian, John H. 2010. "The Effect of Prison Education Programs on Recidivism." Journal of Correctional Education 316-334.

Fazel, Seena, and Achim Wolf. 2015. "A Systematic Review of Criminal Recidivism Rates Worldwide: Current Difficulties and Recommendations for Best Practice." PLoS One 1-8.

Ferraro, Kathleen J., and Angela M. Moe. 2003. "Mothering, Crime, and Incarceration." Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 9-40.

Foster, Holly, and John Hagan. 2007. "Incarceration and Intergenerational Social Exclusion." Social Problems 399-433.

Gilmore, Kim. 2000. "Slavery and Prison - Understanding the Connections." Social Justice 195-205.

Haney, Craig. 2002. "The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for Post-Prison Adjustment." Papers prepared for the "From Prison to Home " Conference. Department of Health and Human Services. 77-92.

Nichols, Harold W. 2013. "Closing the Revolving Door." In So I Can Live: Visions of Life from Death Row, by W.S. Lyon. Nashville: REACH Coalition.

Patterson, Orlando. 1982. Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Pettit, Becky, and Bruce Western. 2004. "Mass Imprisonment and the Life Course: Race and Class Inequality in U.S. Incarceration." American Sociological Review 151-169.

quintero, derrick. 2013. "February 25, 2013 7:46 p.m.." In So I Can Live: Visions of Life from Death Row, by W.S. Lyon. Nashville: REACH Coalition.

Roberts, Dorothy. 2004. "The Social and Moral Cost of Mass In carceration in African American Communities." Stanford Law Review 1271-1305.

Sarchiapone, Marco, Vladimir Carli, Chiara Cuomo, Marco Marchetti, and Alec Roy. 2009. "Association Between Childhood Trauma and Aggresion in Male Prisoners." Psychiatry Research 187-192.

Schnittker, Jason, and Andrea John. 2007. "Enduring Stigma: The Long-Term Effects of Incarceration on Health." Journal of Health and Social Behavior 2007 115-130.

Sterbenz, Christina. 2014. "Why Norway's Prison system is so successful." Business Insider, December 11.

Vacca, James S. 2004. "Educated Prisoners are Less Likely to Return to Prison." Journal of Correctional Education 297-305.

Western, Bruce, and Christopher Wildeman. 2009. "The Black Family and Mass Incarceration." Annals, AAPSS 221-242.

Wilderson, Frank B. 2003. "The Prison Slave as Hegemony's (Silent) Scandal." Social Justice 18-27.

Wilson, James A., and Christine Zozula. 2012. "Risk, Recidivism, and (Re)habilitation." The Prison Journal 203-230.

Footnotes

  1.  The three authors of this piece are members of a reciprocal education group that meets weekly on Tennessee’s Death Row in Nashville, Tennessee. Two of us are outsiders, who enter into the maximum-security institution for these weekly meetings. One of us is lives on Death Row, and has for over thirty years. Our group was started by an academic and activist in 2012 along with a core group of insiders also includes an evolving group of outsider volunteers. The core group of insiders changes based on members joining or departing for various reasons including having their sentences being modified leading to their leaving Death Row.
  2.  Becker, Lawrence C. Habilitation, Health, and Agency. (Oxford U Press, 2012).
  3.  Becker, Lawrence C. Habilitation, Health, and Agency. (Oxford U Press, 2012), 18.
  4.  Becker, Lawrence C. Habilitation, Health, and Agency. (Oxford U Press, 2012), 40.
  5.  Becker, Lawrence C. Habilitation, Health, and Agency. (Oxford U Press, 2012), 75.
  6.  Becker, Lawrence C. Habilitation, Health, and Agency. (Oxford U Press, 2012), 35.
  7.  Becker, Lawrence C. Habilitation, Health, and Agency. (Oxford U Press, 2012), 75.
  8.  Becker, Lawrence C. Habilitation, Health, and Agency. (Oxford U Press, 2012), 75.
  9.  Becker, Lawrence C. Habilitation, Health, and Agency. (Oxford U Press, 2012), 139.
  10.  Du Bois, W.E.B. The Souls of Black Folk. (Literary Classics of the United States, 1986); Davis, Angela, interview by Avery F. Gordon. “Globalism and the prison industrial complex.” (1998); Patterson, Orlando. Slavery and Social Death: A Comparative Study. (Harvard University Press, 1982).
  11.  E.G. Foster, Holly, and John Hagan. "Incarceration and Intergenerational Social Exclusion." Social Problems (2007): 399-433. Gilmore, Kim. "Slavery and Prison - Understanding the Connections." Social Justice (2000): 195-205; Wilderson, Frank B. "The Prison Slave as Hegemony's (Silent) Scandal." Social Justice (2003): 18-27.
  12.  Fazel, Seena, and Achim Wolf. "A Systematic Review of Criminal Recidivism Rates Worldwide: Current Difficulties and Recommendations for Best Practice." PLoS One (2015):1-8.; Sterbenz, Christina. "Why Norway's Prison system is so successful." Business Insider (December 11, 2014).
  13.  Arditti, Joyce A. "Families and Incarceration: An Ecological Approach." Families in Society (2005): 251-260; Clear, Todd R., Dina R. Rose, and Judith A. Ryder. "Incarceration and the Community: The Problem of Removing and Returning Offenders." Crime and Delinquency (2001): 335-351.; Ferraro, Kathleen J., and Angela M. Moe. "Mothering, Crime, and Incarceration." Journal of Contemporary Ethnography (2003): 9-40.; Foster, Holly, and John Hagan. "Incarceration and Intergenerational Social Exclusion." Social Problems (2007): 399-433.; Haney, Craig. "The Psychological Impact of Incarceration: Implications for Post-Prison Adjustment." Papers prepared for the "From Prison to Home " Conference. Department of Health and Human Services. (2002): 77-92.; Roberts, Dorothy. "The Social and Moral Cost of Mass In carceration in African American Communities." Stanford Law Review (2004): 1271-1305.
  14.  Wilson, James A., and Christine Zozula. "Risk, Recidivism, and (Re)habilitation." The Prison Journal (2012): 203-230.
  15.  Sarchiapone, Marco, Vladimir Carli, Chiara Cuomo, Marco Marchetti, and Alec Roy. “Association Between Childhood Trauma and Aggression in Male Prisoners.” Psychiatry Research 165, 1-2 (2009): 187-192.
  16.  Altintas, Merih, and Mustafa Bilici. “Evaluation of Childhood Trauma with Respect to Criminal Behavior, Dissociative Experiences, Adverse Family Experiences and Psychiatric Backgrounds Among Prison Inmates.” Comprehensive Psychiatry 82 (2018): 100-107.
  17.  Altintas, Merih, and Mustafa Bilici. “Evaluation of Childhood Trauma with Respect to Criminal Behavior, Dissociative Experiences, Adverse Family Experiences and Psychiatric Backgrounds Among Prison Inmates.” Comprehensive Psychiatry 82 (2018): 107.
  18.  Altintas, Merih, and Mustafa Bilici. “Evaluation of Childhood Trauma with Respect to Criminal Behavior, Dissociative Experiences, Adverse Family Experiences and Psychiatric Backgrounds Among Prison Inmates.” Comprehensive Psychiatry 82 (2018): 100.
  19.  Altintas, Merih, and Mustafa Bilici. “Evaluation of Childhood Trauma with Respect to Criminal Behavior, Dissociative Experiences, Adverse Family Experiences and Psychiatric Backgrounds Among Prison Inmates.” Comprehensive Psychiatry 82 (2018): 101-101.
  20.  Nichols, Harold W. “Closing the Revolving Door” in So I Can Live: Visions of Life from Death Row, edited by W.S. Lyon. (Nashville: REACH Coalition, 2013), 25-26.
  21.  Nichols, Harold W. “Closing the Revolving Door” in So I Can Live: Visions of Life from Death Row, edited by W.S. Lyon. (Nashville: REACH Coalition, 2013), 25.
  22.  Abdur Rahman, Abu Ali. “Born Not of Love” in So I Can Live: Visions of Life from Death Row, edited by W.S. Lyon. (Nashville: REACH Coalition, 2013), 52.
  23.  DeVeaux, Mika'il. “The Trauma of the Incarceration Experience.” Harvard Civil Rights-Civil Liberties Law Review 48 (2013): 257-278.
  24.  quintero, derrick. “February 25, 2013 7:46 p.m.” in So I Can Live: Visions of Life from Death Row, edited by W.S. Lyon. (Nashville: REACH Coalition, 2013), 1. A note on this citation: derrick quintero intentionally uses lower-case spelling of his first and last name.
  25.  quintero, derrick. “February 25, 2013 7:46 p.m.” in So I Can Live: Visions of Life from Death Row, edited by W.S. Lyon. (Nashville: REACH Coalition, 2013), 1.
  26.  Vacca, James S. “Educated Prisoners are Less Likely to Return to Prison.” Journal of Correctional Education (2004): 297-305. Esperian, John H. “The Effect of Prison Education Programs on Recidivism.” Journal of Correctional Education (2010): 316-334.
  27.  Vacca, James S. “Educated Prisoners are Less Likely to Return to Prison.” Journal of Correctional Education (2004): 299.
  28.  Anderson, Elizabeth. "What is the Point of Equality." Ethics 288 (1999): 287-337.

Citation

Elizabeth Lanphier, Takunda Matose, and Abu Ali Abdur Rahman

Copyright

9.6.2019

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